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To cite this article: Oliver D. Meza & Carlos Moreno-Jaimes (2020) Taming the Beast: Managers' Tactics to Change Frontline Workers' Adversarial Interaction with Policy Targets, International Journal of Public Administration, 43:10, 866-875, DOI: [10.1080/01900692.2019.1660991](https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2019.1660991)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2019.1660991>



Published online: 04 Sep 2019.



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Taming the Beast: Managers' Tactics to Change Frontline Workers' Adversarial Interaction with Policy Targets

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ABSTRACT

This article explains how manager's face noncompliance problems with the use of implementation tactics affecting the relational nature between frontline workers and policy targets. In the argument, the concept of bounded rationality is helpful to explain a set of mechanisms that affect individual's decision-making, although overlooked in some recent streams in the literature by yielding greater importance to rationalistic models of human behaviour. A case study provides the empirical foundation in the effectiveness of the implementation tactics and its underlying rationale. A mixed method approach was used to fulfill the research objectives. Findings support the idea of a set of tactics that managers use to positively engage between frontline workers and citizen in correct(ing) policy implementation gaps.

KEYWORDS

Compliance; implementation; bounded rationality; local government

Introduction

Bureaucrats discretion had been used to explain citizen noncompliance within the implementation gap literature (Hupe & Buffat, 2014; Mutereko, Chitakunye, & Mutereko, 2015). Within this stream, a growing interest is recently shifting focus to the role of managers in shaping the overall program performance (Favero, Meier, & O'Toole, 2016; Sumadilaga, Soetjipto, Wahyuni, & Hari, 2017) addressing supervisor-street level bureaucrats relationships (Brunetto, Farr-wharton, Shacklock, & Robson, 2012), in influencing street level or frontline workers to prompt policy adaptations (Gassner & Gofen, 2018; Lavee, Cohen, & Nouman, 2018), to increase organizational order (Ulfssdotter Eriksson, Larsson, & Adolfsson, 2019) and to steer street-level bureaucrats to figure out ways to allow *authorized* uses of discretion (Brodkin, 2011, 2012) that could eventually reduce implementation gaps. Adaptation of working protocols was observed as a primary function of managers (Gassner & Gofen, 2018; Lavee et al., 2018), which along the recognition of the interaction within the citizen-agent framework (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000), an alternative approach unveils to explain how managers directly affect implementation when coproduction is a crucial condition for policy performance (Alford, 2016). In this sense this article attempts to understand how managers address noncompliance by tactically organizing frontline workers' encounters with target population. Frontline workers

experience stress to which they adapt by coping, frequently using practices to bend the rules (Tummers, Bekkers, Vink, & Musheno, 2015). Authors explain how implementation gaps derived from such stressful interactions were tactically affected by mid-level managers, not only by altering processes or protocols leading to achieve a lower rate of target's noncompliance, but more significantly by shaping the essential nature of the interaction between the state and the citizenship.

Within this approach, the main argument in this article is grounded on the utility of the concept of bounded rationality to explain the efficacy of managerial tactics to influence in the reduction of implementation gaps. Since Simon's (1972) decision-making behaviour theory, distinctions around individuals and organizations' rational and non-rational elements in decision-making processes were present in public administration debates (Jones, 2017). Two basic ideas have served as common venues to explain citizen compliance. First, that reduction of such gaps is achieved by having the right incentives in place to encourage citizens to maximize their utility through compliance with the policy in question (Becker, 1968; Becker & Stigler, 1974). And secondly, by providing citizen with information in order to modify behaviour to comply with public policy objectives (Weaver, 2015). The latter implies making other mechanism salient such as social

norms, deontological or normative predispositions, peer pressure, among others (Alford & Speed, 2006; Braithwaite, 1985, 2006; Jones, 2017; Winter & May, 2001). Individual's bounded rationality explains key aspects in the compliance behaviour along these two set of mechanisms; however, authors use the concept to focus on the effectiveness of one kind of managerial tactics that qualitatively affects participants' sense-making of the situation. More specifically, bounded rationality explain why after managers' tactic was implemented, frontline workers changed their understanding of the coproduction relation; shifting away from an adversarial type of relation, obtained when frontline workers assume a police-based identity, to one more similar to a civic educator, smoothing the interaction towards policy targets, and arguably diminishing opportunities for further implementation gaps.

The theoretical ground in the study offers a contribution along an empirical assessment of two managerial tactics aiming to address policy gaps and ultimately policy efficacy. The argument's empirical foundation is discussed by looking at the case of a local government agency in charge of enforcing parking regulations. The agency's main purpose is to stop people from wrongly parking their vehicles. Organization managers had relied in the use of fines to address compliance problems, but recently warning-notices were incorporated as part of an overall innovation plan. According to the theoretical framework, fines are well aligned to the logic of a rational-calculation set of instruments, while warnings are assigned to a non-calculative set of instruments. The study demonstrates that warnings function under alternative premises such as one explained in the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 2008). The efficacy of both instruments was tested. Problems of compliance have been subject to experimental studies focusing on as tax evasion (Dulleck et al., 2016) littering (Cialdini, 2003), voter registration (Rose, 2011), among others. This article relied on a mixed-method approach to uncover underlying mechanisms by triangulating information (Hendren, Luo, & Pandey, 2018) in line with the regulatory managers' rationale and expectation. A field experiment was designed to test the efficacy of both instruments on the behaviour of private automobile drivers in three different areas in a city of Mexico. But interviews unveiled the utility of instruments as a managerial tactic to change the adversarial relationship between frontline workers and the policy target.

The rest of the article is organized as follows. The first section reviews the most common assumptions behind the tactics used by governments to secure individuals' compliance with laws or policies. Section two

defines and discusses bounded rationality. It points how it aids to understand alternative policy tactics which are available to governments in order to make citizen comply with rules. Section three establishes the case study in a city in Mexico where the two compliance models were observed. This is followed by a section on methodology, findings, and the discussion. The article concludes unveiling the importance of managers' role in directing efforts to care for the interactive experience of bureaucracy with policies' targets in support of further coproduction processes within policies.

Rational & bounded-rational motivations to comply

Governments commonly address problems of noncompliance based on the premise that, regardless of their capacity, people comply when enough incentives exist affecting their behaviour. While this premise does not describe a typical citizen (Weaver, 2014), is found to be influential in government's reliance on a set of rational and calculative instruments to make people comply. However, an acritical embracement of such premises bias policy-makers' attention away from identifying alternative, yet effective, set of instruments to reduce noncompliance. This section analyses instruments governments use to make people comply, making emphasis in an alternative set of instruments derived from a non-calculative approach (Jones, 2003; March & Olsen, 2008). Government's attempt to push citizen to comply would realize the mix of motivations that people bring to a decision in a compliance situation. In this case, the concept of *bounded rationality* represents an opportunity to deal with this complexity.

Rational-instrumental calculation, limited rationality and its tactics

An initial approach consists of stating that rational beings comply with rules when they perceive resulting benefits outweigh the costs (Winter & May, 2001). In this perspective, citizens are seen as utility maximisers being this a fundamental premise underlying the rational-instrumental approach. The framework is consistent with dissuasion theory, which has been instrumental in generating government tools for making people comply with the law. Examples are punishments, fines, monitoring schemes, among others (Ingram & Schneider, 1990; Weaver, 2015). However, people's information-processing capacity, which is needed to function as rational maximisers, is said to be limited (John, Smith, & Stoker, 2009; Simon, 1972; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009; Weaver, 2014). Citizens'

limited rationality leads to erratic decision-making due to its inability to appreciate the scope of the negative implications of their own actions. Slow feedback cycle amplifies the problem (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). The problem of smoking offers an illustrative example. When people find themselves sick due to a smoking habit, the chance of undoing the damage by giving up the cigarette is virtually null once the disease has reached a certain point. Unless people can anticipate the consequences of their actions, decisions are affected due to limited rationality.

Upon limited rationality, governments are called to create tools designed to increase information and to extend cognitive capacities in order to achieve compliance (Weaver, 2014). Such building capacity tools assume individuals will comply as long as they have more information (Schneider & Ingram, 1990), leading to knowledge formation thus increasing compliance with policy (Winter & May, 2001). Additional strategies aimed at perfecting rationality focus on the choice architecture of a specific situation, i.e. *Nudge* tactics. Prioritizing decisions or establishing standard options steer people toward upholding policy objectives (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). Similarly, physical spaces can be modified to ease people opting for certain courses of action. Lines painted on streets help drivers calculate the distance between vehicles and avoid collisions while adjusting their speed (Jones, Pykett, & Whitehead, 2013).

To summarize, the rational-instrumental approach leads to the proposition that given a noncompliance problem caused by people's limited rationality, tactics that belong to this paradigm are those where governments' efforts rest on individual's rational calculation, and/or improves people's computational capacity for them to make rational calculations.

The logic of appropriateness, bounded rationality and its tactics

Humans also respond to non-calculative motivations, such as the natural willingness to obey social norms, or citizens' inherent obligation to obey the law (Alford & Speed, 2006; Braithwaite, 1985, 2006; Weaver, 2015; Winter & May, 2001). The logic behind these motivations, which is distinct from a calculative logic, is grounded on identity considerations (Oberfield, 2010) such as *What is the most appropriate way for someone like me to proceed?* It is moral obligation that drives the action, or an ideological sense of what is right and consistent with one's personal beliefs (Fernandez & Rainey, 2006; Schneider & Ingram, 1990). Moreover, such non-calculative motivations can override strictly rational thinking when they appeal to a sense of

responsibility guided by a logic of what is most appropriate (Howlett & Mukherjee, 2017; March & Olsen, 2008). Positions and decisions that individuals assume when they join a new organization provide good examples, for instance, the Miles's law "*you stand where you sit*". While the utility-maximization approach suggests making decisions on the basis of a cost-benefit assessment of the available alternatives, the logic of *appropriateness* describe a different way of thinking. A *satisficing* rather a maximizing criteria prevails (B. D. Jones, 2003; Simon, 1972, 1997) which is more about answering questions such as *Who am I? What circumstances am I facing?* and *What is expected from someone in my position?* (March & Olsen, 2008).

In this sense, governments' deployed tactics must consider the causes of bounded rationality. The concept calls to understand that human decision are motivated by different interpretations of the world, which give rise to different heuristic rules, or as being affected by their own emotional processes (Arellano & Barreto, 2016; Gigerenzer, 2007). It is ideological predispositions, beliefs and perceptions that set boundaries to human decisions (Jones, 2003; Schneider & Ingram, 1990; Scholz & Lubel, 1998; Simon, 1956; Winter & May, 2001). Furthermore, ideology and perceptions are inserted in a context, and the resulting mixture affects decisions of whether or not to comply with a certain policy provision (Ingram & Schneider, 1990; Simon, 1956).

The available tools addressing humans' bounded rationality aims to modify cognitive frameworks; it attempts to correct imprecise or confusing information that has taken root in people's minds regarding programs or laws, or to change citizens' mistaken notions about causal theories (Weaver, 2015). These tools vary greatly depending on the specificities on the ground. Gofen and Needham (2015) provided examples of officials' effort to personalize vaccination programs to increase compliance of parents in Israel. Further tactics imply the use of symbolic measures (Ingram & Schneider, 1990; Jones, Shanahan, & Mcbeth, 2014) to assure policy requirements' consistency with population target's belief system. Boosting compliance efforts are also made by improving relations between regulators and regulates, appealing to intangible values such as justice, impartiality and legitimacy (Murphy, Tyler, & Curtis, 2009; Scholz & Lubel, 1998; Winter & May, 2001). Under this logic, inflexible auditors are prescribed to be replaced with a more educational model of regulator in order to reduce creative compliance and achieving behaviour more genuinely in tune with policies' objectives (Alford & Speed, 2006; Braithwaite, 2006). A call in changing the identity in the regulator's mode is expected to improve the relational nature

between the citizen and the state, as seen before in studies (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000).

In short, these considerations lead to an alternative theoretical proposition. The idea is to deal with non-compliance problems using policy tactics that modify people's cognitive frameworks by appealing to motivations other than rational calculation, such as ideological, cultural or deontological cognitive elements.

Boosting compliance in the free sidewalks program

Governments can take advantage from a wider array of tools to encourage compliance with their policy objectives when alternative notions about changing individual behaviour are considered. The notion of bounded rationality plays an important role to identify policy tactics seldom explored by government managers to reduce implementation gap and ultimately achieve greater compliance. An example is discussed in the following sections. A rational-instrumental tactic, a fine-ticket, was the default tool used to deal with the problem of noncompliance with the law. Later a different one appealing to the logic of appropriateness, a warning-notice, was introduced. The aim is to show how both are effective tools, and to understand the rationale behind the second one, as a way of unveiling managers' role to reduce policy implementation gaps by affecting frontline workers identity base to provoke a less adversarial mode of interaction with policy targets.

The context of the free sidewalks program

Early after the new mayor of Guadalajara took office in 2015 elections the administration decided to implement a program to clear the city's sidewalks, many of which were blocked by wrongfully parked cars. A case study was developed from a small local agency (street-level organization – SLO) in charge of getting automobile drivers to respect local regulations governing public parking. The agency and its regulatory basis have existed for many years, but change was needed in order to correct implementation gaps allegedly associated with low citizen compliance. The incoming administration decided to make a small change to its implementation: instead of fining offenders, the administrators started issuing warnings and subsequently, they alternated warnings with fines. The purpose in this research is to determine the effectiveness of these two tactics and the main rationale behind them.

Mixed methods research design

The research was designed under a mixed-methods approach, which is being increasingly used in the field of public administration and public policy (Hendren et al., 2018). The designed called for a first round of interviews applied to directors and operators in order to learn about the program's objectives and its implementation process. Secondly, a field experiment was applied to gather further evidence on the impact of the program in its two tactical modalities. A mixed methods research design allowed evidence triangulation (Hendren et al., 2018; Lieberman, 2005; Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007), and therefore evaluate the intuition of the street-level managers who designed the tactics of warnings. Whether it represented an effective way to discourage drivers from wrongly parking their vehicles over sidewalks, was a matter of empirical evidence. Mixed methods also served with a complementary purpose (Hendren et al., 2018). Qualitative information helped to understand the plausible main mechanism behind the tactics' effectiveness. As discussed below, that warning-notices' main effect is one of changing the programs' operator's mode of identity, and therefore change the nature in the relation between citizen and the agent during interactions. Embracing such an educational mode, as opposed to a punitive role, was ostensibly directed due to the introduction of warning-notices to temporarily replace fine-tickets.

Phase 1. Interviews

Phase one lasted approximately 5 months between 2015 and 2016. Semi-structured interviews were made to the street-level organization managers (N = 4) and operators (N = 20) of the Free Sidewalks Program (FSP). The aim was to understand the tactics and assumptions employed in the program's tactics. Further insights were gained into the logic behind the inclusion of warnings in the day-to-day operations. Operators' information over the implementation was gathered using a semi-structured survey applied to 57% of the street-level bureaucrats in the organization. The main purpose was to corroborate in their views the program's objectives, their personal belief regarding the logic behind the two instruments (fines and warnings), the relative efficacy, as well as their interactions with the drivers.

Phase 2. Field experiment

The next phase consisted of implementing the two tactics as a field experiment, enabling a systematic

comparison on the effectiveness in reducing wrongly parked vehicles. Three residential areas were chosen jointly with the organization managers, to compare the results of the two approaches in contrast to a control group. One area would be treated with fine-tickets, a second area with warning-notices, and a third area would correspond to a control group. The three criteria behind the selection of areas where first, areas of the city where the new policy tactics (warnings) had not yet been used. Second, similar areas in terms of the quality of the urban infrastructure, and mainly residential areas. Third, to prevent spillover effects, non-adjacent areas were chosen. This selection was based on the information provided by the program managers and the official statistics at the level of Basic Geostatistical Areas (AGEB, in its initials in Spanish) collected by the National Statistics Office in Mexico, the INEGI (National Institute of Statistics and Geography).¹

Fines were applied to an area called *Tetlan* (Group 1) and warnings to an area called *Talpita* (Group 3). The control group (Group 2) was the area of *Olimpica* which was only monitored with no further intervention. The unit of observation was city block in each area, defined as the roadways surrounding a residential polygon. In accordance with the capacity of the agency to deploy a three-hour operation, the tactics were implemented in nine polygons, in such a way that in each area the behaviours of 97 blocks were registered (32 blocks in each of the two experimental areas and 33 in the control area). The interventions proceeded as follows:

- (1) Baseline. In each area an independent survey team² made observations of the number of infractions committed per block. Simultaneous observations were made on Mondays between 4 and 7 pm in the three areas during 3 weeks prior to the first intervention.
- (2) Intervention. Two FSP street-level operation teams simultaneously applied the treatments to the corresponding areas (Group 1 and Group 3) similarly between 4 and 7 pm on a Monday. Upon consideration of the program managers, reinforcement was applied on the following Tuesday.
- (3) Post-treatment line. On Monday of the following week, between 4 and 7 pm, the independent survey team once again counted the number of infractions per block on each of the three areas.

Data analysis

The difference between the baseline and the post-treatment line, compared over the three areas, would reveal the Average Treatment in Treated (ATT) of the policy tactics. To analyse the data, the following stylized formal function was used:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Treatment} + \beta_2 \text{Time} + \beta_3 \text{Interaccion} + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

where

<i>Y</i>	Infractions in block;
<i>Treatment</i>	Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 = Treated area and 0 = Control area;
<i>Time</i>	Dummy variable that takes a value of 0 to identify the time period prior to the start of the two treatments (i.e., the baseline) and of 1 for the post-treatment period.
<i>Interaccion</i>	Interaction term that provides the Average Treatment in Treated (ATT);
ε	Standard errors grouped at the block level.

Areas were selected following the criteria as indicated above; however, their initial levels in the variable of interest, as shown in Table 1, were different. The difference-in-differences (DID) model corrects the resulting estimate from pre-existence levels in the value of the variable of interest (Stock & Watson, 2007, p. 482). The interaction coefficient produced by the DID is the *Average Treatment in Treated* (ATT). The ATT of a DID, under strict assumptions, is equivalent to difference of averages in an experimental framework, offering an efficient non-biased estimate (Green & Green, 2012). To assure existing assumptions were taking place at certain degree, the regression model grouped errors at the block polygon level correcting for biases due to heterogeneity, and therefore, possible diverging pathways of groups. The dependent variable is a count of the infractions at the block level. The number of zeros is prolific, to the extent that the average frequently falls below the standard deviation (see Table 1). Accordingly, the model was estimated using a negative binomial regression. A post-estimation proceeded to

Table 1. Descriptive statistics on the intervention.

		Media	Des. Est.	Min	Max	N
Group 1 (fines)	Block law infringement (freq)	0.84	1.48	0	5.66	64
	Time (0,1)	0.5	0.50	0	1	64
Group 3 (warnings)	Block law infringement (freq)	1.39	1.76	0	9.33	64
	Time (0,1)	0.5	0.50	0	1	64
Group 2 (Control)	Block law infringement (freq)	2.44	1.51	0	6.33	66
	Time (0,1)	0.5	0.50	0	1	66

Source: Authors' elaboration

determine the marginal change on the basis of the average value of the variables, as well as their interactions.

Results

Understanding the logic of the tactics

The shortage of private parking spots in residential areas is a common cause of lawbreaking. Fines on average cost around \$111 US Dlls, per event. Considering the average income level in the city, these fines could become a serious burden for many.³ The interaction between the drivers and the officers is never easy; referring to the operators, one manager pointed out, “*Not everyone is prepared to intervene in an adverse situation, for crisis management.*” (Interview D-3)⁴. Operators indicated a preference in avoiding confrontations with transgressors (3.4) and mentioned feelings of nervousness when having to confront transgressors (3.1) (see Table 2). According to the program managers, the reasoning behind using warning-notices was twofold: first to remove the widespread idea that the program’s aim is to raise revenue, and second, to promote a more positive interaction between traffic officers and drivers. “*I have gone out to do these operations and they [citizens] have treated us with a degree of arrogance you wouldn’t believe.*” (Interview D-1).

According to the interviews, operators frequently speak with the offenders and asked them to move their cars before providing a fine-ticket. With the introduction of warning-notices, this procedure has become somewhat institutionalized. When the drivers are not present at the site, the operators search for them knocking at homes or businesses. According to the survey, talking before levying a fine is something citizens appreciate (4.7). When they cannot find the transgressor, the officers choose between leaving a ticket that imposes a fine on the offending vehicle or leaving a warning-notice. Under ordinary conditions, this decision is made at the operators’ discretion with the

Table 2. Operators’ survey summary results.

Answer to questions is a 5 Likert-point scale where 1 is “Completely disagree” to 5 “Completely agree”.	Average	Std. dev	Min	Max	N
Sometimes you have to put yourself in the citizens’ shoes to know how to deal with them	4.4	0.933	2	5	20
I prefer to avoid confronting the citizen.	3.4	1.182	1	5	20
Law offenders are grateful when instead of giving them a fine-ticket, we talk with them.	4.7	0.470	4	5	20
It makes me a little nervous to have to confront a transgressor.	3.1	1.395	1	5	20
Giving warnings is more educational than giving tickets.	3.4	1.603	1	5	20
Personally, I like giving tickets more than giving warnings.	3.7	1.418	1	5	20

Source: Elaboration of authors with data from survey applied to street-level operators.

aid of a field supervisor in the team. Discretion plays an important part in the interaction “*You treat people according to how they treat you*”, “*If they are aggressive, you give them a ticket*” (Interviews with operators). However, even if operators believe a warning-notice is more educational than a fine-ticket (3.4), they mostly preference to leave a ticket imposing an economic sanction (3.7). Encounters with citizen is never easy, but the use of fine-tickets alone disable a valuable opportunity to engage in a different way with policy targets.

The effectiveness of tactics

The results of the experiment suggest that the regulatory agency succeeded in getting people to stop breaking the law by using both the fines and warnings. The simple analysis of difference (see Table 3) shows that treated areas, group 1 (fines) and group 3 (warnings), were plausibly affected primarily by the treatments. The difference between the post-treatment measurement and the average baseline result, in terms of the percentage rate change is considerable. While the control group (2) report a 26% reduction, the treated areas report a reduction of 54% in group 1 and 49% in group 3. It is worth noting that the treated areas report systematically lower levels of rule-breaking in the three baselines yet the rate of change in these areas is higher.

A more rigorous analysis considering the change between the treated areas and the control area was conducted with the DID model applied with a negative

Table 3. Simple differences within groups.

	Fines	Control	Warnings
Infringement incidences (freq)	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3
Baseline 1	38	88	55
Baseline 2	45	106	70
Baseline 3	34	94	50
Baseline Average (BA)	37	92.67	59.33
Post-treatment (PT)	17	69	30
Change (BA – PT)	–20.00	–23.67	–29.33
Rate of change (%)	–54%	–26%	–49%

Source: Authors’ elaboration

Table 4. Results diff-in-diff negative binomial model.

N = 194					
Treatment	Group	Coef.	Std.Err.	z	P > z
Fines	1	–.8873193	.3167846	–2.80	0.005
Warnings	3	–.4150659	.2792581	–1.49	0.137
Post-Treatment	1	–.2949023	.0866783	–3.40	0.001
	Group # Time				
1) Fines	1 1	–.4828022	.292668	–1.65	0.099
3) Warnings	3 1	–.3870715	.2324615	–1.67	0.096
Constant		1.032501	.0929662	11.11	0.000
Cluster(block)					
Pseudo R2 = 0.0652					

Source: Authors’ elaboration

Table 5. Post-estimation marginal effect.

Prediction at the margin		N = 194			
Treatment	Group	Margin	Std. Err	z	P > z
Fine	1	0.84375	0.1326333	6.36	0.000
Control	2	2.449495	0.2635751	9.29	0.000
Warnings	3	1.395833	0.1831999	7.62	0.000
Baseline (Average)	Time 0	1.948454	0.1881048	10.36	0.000
Post-Treatment	1	1.195876	0.1380146	8.66	0.000
Group # Time					
1) Fines	1 0	1.15625	0.2251476	5.14	0.000
	1 1	0.53125	0.1402674	3.79	0.000
2) Control	2 0	2.808081	0.4103173	6.84	0.000
	2 1	2.090909	0.3309487	6.32	0.000
3) Warnings	3 0	1.854167	0.308838	6	0.000
	3 1	0.9375	0.1971495	4.76	0.000

*Delta Method

Source: Authors' elaboration

binomial regression (see Table 4). The model also groups the errors at the polygon level, thus attempting to correct estimations on other assumptions with regards to block homogeneity. Results show that the treatments reduce the number of rule violations. Fines (−.48) present a higher negative coefficient than warnings do (−.38); this is the expected count logarithm as a function of the prediction variable, in this case given by the treatment. The results are statistically significant at 10% level.

The post-estimate of the previous model (see Table 5) suggests that the three areas underwent reductions in the number of infractions per block between the baseline time and the post-treatment time. As for the treated areas, group 1 (fines) went down by .62 infractions per block on average, and group 3 (warnings) went down by .92. The average size of the warning seemed greater with fines, although the model suggests that fines have a higher efficacy probability than warnings.

Discussion

The results seem to confirm that the two public policy tactics implemented in the city – one grounded on rational calculation (fines) and the other on the *logic of appropriateness* (warnings) – helped to attain the objective of reducing drivers' illegal behaviour. Fines-tickets were effective in reducing the incidence of violations of municipal regulations, in line with expectations from the rational-calculative stream. Noteworthy, warning-notices such as fine-tickets, succeeded in affecting drivers' behaviour as expected, and therefore represents a viable alternative for enhancing policy effectiveness.

The mixed-methods approach made result-triangulation possible, enhancing the internal validity of the findings (Hendren et al., 2018; Sale & Brazil, 2002).

With the support of this approach, confirmation was made with regards to the mechanisms of warning notices. Success in its effectiveness, according to interviews, is addressed by bringing down normal difficulties within windows of interaction between citizen and frontline workers. The interviews among personnel in the regulatory agency indicate that operators face irritation and anger of citizens being fined. As a result, operators often prefer to avoid interaction or commit administrative offences that undermine policy's objectives (Tummers et al., 2015). Discretion in these windows of interaction affect implementation gaps and further compliance (Alford & Speed, 2006; Braithwaite, 1985; Gofen, 2013; Nurunnabi, 2018). Street-level managers' failure to moderate these interactions produce operators' risk-mitigation strategies by playing with the administrative processes, leading to possible acts of bribery or collusion with the transgressor (Braithwaite, 2006). Furthermore, when agents stop interacting with citizens, or commit administrative offences, a valuable opportunity is missed to engage creatively with citizens. Warning-notices reaffirm agents identity-base rule-following behaviour (Oberfield, 2010) by modifying the cost of interactions and therefore it improves an alternative mechanism to make citizen comply appealing to a logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 2008).

From the results above, managers and policy decision-makers should derive policy implications cautiously. By no means, the argument is to replace one tactic with another, but to understand how in many other ways can governments affect citizen compliance and managers reduce implementation gaps. A repeated and unsupervised tactics such as warnings or fines might prove to be ineffective. However, reducing such possibility begins by acknowledging managerial and implementation opportunities, frequently overlooked when attempting to correct noncompliance (Gofen, 2013). The implementation reported here demonstrates that both tactics' effect could last at least a week. However, relevant literature suggests that regulatory activities need a continuous management, especially interventions that appeal to persuasion where a relationship of trust needs constant nurturing (Alford & Speed, 2006; Braithwaite, 2006).

Conclusion

This research is motivated to contribute to the literature on implementation and compliance in public administration in several ways. It unveils an unexplored role of managers to address implementation gaps (Brodkin, 2011; Gassner & Gofen, 2018; Gofen, Blomqvist, Needham, Warren, & Winblad, 2018; Weaver, 2015). Managers can do so by redirecting their efforts in caring for the interactive

experience of bureaucracy with policies' targets. Within the analogy, *taming the beast* is what managers do instead of using *carrots and sticks*. Authors contribute to the call to explore new avenues for managerial efficacy (Cooke, Brant, & Woods, 2018) bringing back to the table an alternative set of tactics appealing to non-calculative individual's motivations; a more psychological approach developed within administrative studies (see Jones, 2002, 2003, 2017; Simon, 1972, 1997). Furthermore, recent waves of behavioural economics have brought *nudge* and other similar tactics to the mainstream of governments' innovations. These kinds of interventions attempt to affect policy implementation and citizen compliance however these kind-alike tactics are all subjected to the rational-calculative approach, disregarding other forces of behavioural change.

In the attempt to explore questions such as how governments' managers can use different policy tactics to compel citizens to follow public policy provisions. Authors argue that further understanding of bounded rationality helps in the design of new and less explored tools enhance the coproduction process making bureaucrats engage in a more fruitful way with citizens (Alford, 2016; Alford & Speed, 2006; Braithwaite, 2006). To exemplify, evidence was brought from a case study. A small regulatory agency that belongs to the local government of a large city in Mexico executed a program aimed at reducing the number of infractions committed by automobile drivers who wrongly park their vehicles. While the main working tool is a fine-ticket that imposes an economic sanction on the transgressor, a new tool was afterwards incorporated; warnings, which are messages that, without levying an economic sanction, let drivers know when their actions breaks the rules. Each tactic – fine-tickets or warning-notices – matches one of the two theoretical approaches: the rational-calculative approach or the *logic of appropriateness*. Individual's bounded rationality, in this sense, provide a window of opportunity to exploit in the advancement of public policy objectives and to solve common and frequent problems within implementation phases of policy.

Notes

1. According to INEGI, an urban AGEb is a territorial extension occupied by a number of blocks, generally 1 to 50, bounded by streets, avenues, walkways or any other easily identified ground-level feature, where the land is used primarily for housing, industry, services or commerce (INEGI, 2010).
2. The independent survey team is different from the street-level operational team (the traffic agents), but they were previously trained to be able to identify infractions correctly.
3. The amount of the fines depends on the exact law infringement. Details are available here <http://portal.guadalajara.gob.mx/programa-banquetas-libres>. The monthly average income level in Mexico according to the National Statistics Office INEGI in 2015 was 9.6 thousand pesos, equivalent to 533 US dls. <https://www.inegi.org.mx/app/indicadores/?ind=6204482539#divFV6204482698#D6204482539>.
4. Interviews with Managers: Interview D-1 and D-3 were the Legal Affairs Manager and the Field Operations Manager correspondingly. Other verbatims came from unstructured questions made to operators along the semi-structured survey.

Acknowledgements

Authors would like to thanks to the anonymous referees and the editor of the journal. Also acknowledge the help provided by a number of colleagues who commented previous versions of this paper. Authors appreciate the help of "Demoskopica" during the fieldwork and the help of our research assistants along the whole project.

Funding

This work was supported by the Public Policy National Laboratory (LNPP) in CIDE, within the Democratic Governance Project launched in the year of 2015. The research project was then titled and submitted as "The Small Policy Research Project".

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