Do competitive elections produce better-quality governments?: Evidence from Mexican municipalities, 1990-2000
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Fecha
2007
Autores
Moreno-Jaimes, Carlos
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University of Texas Press
Resumen
Descripción
Electoral theories of governmental accountability assume that competitive elections produce responsive governments because they allow voters to punish or reward the performance of incumbent politicians at the ballot box. This research note investigates whether the increasing competitiveness of municipal elections in Mexico during the 1990s has improved the performance of local governments by focusing on the provision of potable water and drainage. The empirical evidence does not seem to support the electoral accountability hypothesis, but rather suggests that municipal governments are more responsive to the influence of socioeconomic modernity, as well as to the direct pressure of politically mobilized citizens. The findings cast doubts on the idea that competitive elections, by themselves, will significantly improve the quality of local governments in the country.
Palabras clave
Competencia Electoral, Gobiernos Subnacionales, Políticas Públicas
Citación
Moreno-Jaimes, C. (2007). Do competitive elections produce better-quality governments?: Evidence from Mexican municipalities, 1990-2000. Latin American Research Review, 42(2), 136-153.