Do competitive elections produce better-quality governments?: Evidence from Mexican municipalities, 1990-2000

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dc.contributor.authorMoreno-Jaimes, Carlos
dc.date.accessioned2023-08-10T16:44:38Z
dc.date.available2023-08-10T16:44:38Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.descriptionElectoral theories of governmental accountability assume that competitive elections produce responsive governments because they allow voters to punish or reward the performance of incumbent politicians at the ballot box. This research note investigates whether the increasing competitiveness of municipal elections in Mexico during the 1990s has improved the performance of local governments by focusing on the provision of potable water and drainage. The empirical evidence does not seem to support the electoral accountability hypothesis, but rather suggests that municipal governments are more responsive to the influence of socioeconomic modernity, as well as to the direct pressure of politically mobilized citizens. The findings cast doubts on the idea that competitive elections, by themselves, will significantly improve the quality of local governments in the country.es_MX
dc.description.sponsorshipITESO, A.C.es
dc.identifier.citationMoreno-Jaimes, C. (2007). Do competitive elections produce better-quality governments?: Evidence from Mexican municipalities, 1990-2000. Latin American Research Review, 42(2), 136-153.es_MX
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11117/9609
dc.language.isospaes_MX
dc.publisherUniversity of Texas Presses_MX
dc.rights.urihttp://quijote.biblio.iteso.mx/licencias/CC-BY-NC-2.5-MX.pdfes_MX
dc.subjectCompetencia Electorales_MX
dc.subjectGobiernos Subnacionaleses_MX
dc.subjectPolíticas Públicases_MX
dc.titleDo competitive elections produce better-quality governments?: Evidence from Mexican municipalities, 1990-2000es_MX
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees_MX
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiones_MX

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